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RECENT DECISIONS
be camouflaged and the prophylactic purposes of the Act
readily evaded."
Thus, by refusing to review the status of the at-large positions,
the Beer majority adopted a procedure permitting the avoid-
ance of the purpose of the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
The reasoning of the Court in Beer will affect voting rights
litigation in several ways: First, courts will continue to accept
the "retrogression" test. This test would permit the absurd
situation of a black population majority in New Orleans by the
1980 census, but an apportionment plan which gives only one
council seat to a district with a black voting majority. Accord-
ing to the Court's reasoning, since no retrogression occurred,
the plan would be constitutional.
The second effect of Beer is to cast uncertainty on the ques-
tion of who carries the burden of proof in section 5 cases. But
most importantly, Beer encourages a minimalistic approach to
the problem of voting discrimination. In testifying during hear-
ings on the original Voting Rights Act, former Attorney General
Katzenbach stated: "The lesson is plain. [The Civil Rights
Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964] have had only minimal effect.
They have been too slow."91 Only further litigation will deter-
mine whether the Court's decision in Beer v. United States has
"slowed" the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in general, and section
5 specifically, to the point of ineffectiveness.
ROBERT S. BERMAN
Constitutional Law - Tenth Amendment - Fair Labor
Standards Act - Minimum Wage Requirement Held In-
applicable to State Employees - Since the United States
Supreme Court's abrupt reversal of direction in 1941 in United
States v. Darby' the power of Congress to regulate private per-
sons and corporations under the commerce clause2 has been
90. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
91. 1965 Hearings, supra note 29, at 4.
1. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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"embracing and penetrating." Except for some instances in
which the Supreme Court has found congressional enactments
to infringe on constitutionally guaranteed rights,4 Congress has
exercised power under the commerce clause without judicial
restraint. Congressional regulation of private activity has been
held to be limited only by the requirement that "the means
chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end
permitted by the Constitution."5
In a line of cases beginning with United States v. California6
in 1936, the Court has refused to limit otherwise valid Congres-
sional regulations based on the commerce clause merely be-
cause the person regulated is the state or one of its
subdivisions. When the Court decided Maryland v. Wirtz in
1968,1 it appeared settled that the states' right to challenge
regulations based on the commerce power was no different than
that of a private individual.8
However, in National League of Cities v. Usery,9 the Su-
preme Court unexpectedly called a halt to the further expan-
sion of congressional power over the states under the commerce
clause. In that case the Court held that Congress may not
exercise its power so as "to directly displace the States' free-
dom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernment functions."' 0
In applying this rule to provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act which made the minimum wage and overtime re-
strictions applicable to all nonsupervisory employees of states
and their political subdivisions," the Court found that the
amendment's provisions would have "impermissibly
interfere[d] with the integral government functions of these
3. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
4. Congressional enactments which have been found to be fully within the grant
of the legislative authority contained in the commerce clause have nevertheless been
invalidated because found to offend against the right to trial by jury contained in the
sixth amendment, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); or the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
5. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
6. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
7. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
8. Id. at 198.
9. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
10. Id. at 2474.




bodies.' ' '2 The Court distinguished the power of Congress to
regulate private citizens and businesses under the commerce
clause from its power over the states as states,' " and concluded
that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
which may not be impaired by Congress, although Congress
possesses the authority to regulate the subject matter under the
commerce clause. This limitation on the power of Congress
exists because of our federal system of government embodied
in the Constitution and particularly in the tenth amendment.' 4
However, the majority opinion in National League of Cities,
written by Justice Rehnquist, did not declare that every con-
gressional enactment under the commerce clause which affects
the states as states is unconstitutional. Rather, the Court es-
tablished the "essential function test," 5 so named by Justice
Brennan in his dissenting opinion, in which the constitution-
ality of any congressional action enacted under the commerce
clause affecting the states as states is determined by asking
whether the exercise of the commerce power in these circum-
stances forces directly upon the states that choice of Congress
"as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made.""6 This test is one of
degree,'7 and as explained by Justice Blackmun in his concur-
ring opinion, it adopts a balancing approach whereby the inter-
est of the states in controlling their integral governmental func-
tions is weighed against federal power in areas where the fed-
eral interest is demonstratively greater and where state compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be necessary.' 8
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
THROUGH THE 1974 AMENDMENTS.
In 1938 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act
(F.L.S.A.) requiring employers covered by the Act to pay their
employees a minimum hourly wage,'9 to pay them at one-and-
12. 96 S. Ct. at 2473.
13. Id. at 2471.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. X states, "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
15. 96 S. Ct. at 2487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 2475-76.
17. Id. at 2473.
18. Id. at 2476.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970) (originally enacted ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060).
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one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in
excess of forty during a work week'" and to keep certain records
to aid in the enforcement of the Act.2' In United States v.
Darby22 the Supreme Court upheld the Act as a valid exercise
of congressional power under the commerce clause.
Since its enactment in 1938, the Act has been continuously
amended to extend coverage to a greater number of industries
and employees. The 1961 amendments to the Act extended its
coverage to persons who were employed in enterprises engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.? The
effect of this amendment was to extend coverage to employees
not personally engaged in commerce, but employed by an en-
terprise with employees who were engaged in commerce.
As originally enacted, the Act excluded the states and their
political subdivisions from its coverage.24 In 1966 Congress
amended the definition of "employer" under the Act, removing
the exemption of the states and their political subdivisions
with respect to employees of state hospitals, institutions,
schools and transit companies.25 The enterprise concept was
also made applicable to these government entities.26 The ra-
tionale for this extension is stated in the 1966 Committee Re-
ports: "These enterprises, which are not proprietary, that is,
not operated for profit, are engaged in activities which are in
substantial competition with similar activities carried on by
enterprises organized for a business purpose. 127 Both the 1961
and 1966 amendments, as they apply to the states, were upheld
by the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz.?
In 1974, Congress again broadened the coverage of the Act
by including within the definition of "employer" a "public
agency" and including within the definition of "enterprises
20. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(3) (1970) (originally enacted ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1970) (originally enacted ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060).
22. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
23. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65, amending 29 U.S.C. §§
203(r), 203(s), 206(b), 207(a)(2) (1958).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1940).
25. Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 831, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)
(Supp. II, 1964).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(r), 203(s) (1970), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d),
203(r), 203(s) (1964).
27. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong.
2d Sess. 16 (1966).
28. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce" - "an activity of a public agency." 9 Thus, the 1974
amendments completely removed the Act's prior exemption of
employees of states and their political subdivisions, except for
some executive, administrative and professional personnel,3°
and for individuals holding public elective office or serving
such an officeholder in one of several capacities. 3' In effect, the
amendments applied the minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements of the Act to eleven million state and city govern-
ment employees, 32 and imposed on the states requirements
almost identical to those imposed on private employers. 3
I. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE ACT AS APPLIED TO STATE AND CITY
FUNCTIONS
A. Maryland v. Wirtz
The Court considered the constitutionality of the 1966
amendments to the Act extending the minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to employees of state hospitals, in-
stitutions, and schools in Maryland v. Wirtz.34 In that case the
State of Maryland contended that the expansion of coverage
through the enterprise concept was beyond the power of Con-
gress under the commerce clause35 and that coverage of state-
operated hospitals and schools was also beyond the commerce
power.31
The Court rejected the State's challenge to the enterprise
concept holding that the validity of the concept is supported
by strong judicial precedent and by common sense. 3 In reject-
ing the State's contention that the extension of the Act's cover-
age was an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power
because it interfered with sovereign state functions, the Court
in Wirtz documented the effect of state-run hospitals and
schools on commerce and concluded that: "It is therefore clear
29. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
30. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)(1) (1970).
31. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (1970).
32. See Brief for Appellant at 10, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465
(1976), citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN 1973 (1973).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, creating 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1970). Section
207(k) created a limited exemption for police and fire protection employees.
34. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188.
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that a 'rational basis' exists for congressional action prescribing
minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals, as for
other importing enterprises."3
The Court then rejected the State's argument that although
the labor conditions in the schools and hospitals were within
the reach of the commerce power, that power was unconstitu-
tionally applied and therefore must yield to state sovereignty
when the state exercised its governmental functions.39 Finding
the argument untenable, the Court ruled that nothing in the
Constitution required either the national or a state government
to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the other's
exercise of its power.4" The Court held that:
[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regu-
lations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of com-
merce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in
economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State
too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regula-
tion. This was settled by the unanimous decision in United
States v. California .... 1
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas contended
that the majority's decision was a serious invasion of state
sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment that is not con-
sistent with constitutional federalism .42 Justice Douglas noted
the effects of the Act on the state legislatures and the political
subdivisions of the states, concluding that the exercise of the
commerce power should never be allowed to destroy state sov-
ereignty. He further suggested that the question of whether a
particular commerce power regulation of state activity was per-
missible should be governed by the principle set forth in New
York v. United States,43 i.e., that the federal government may
not unduly interfere with the sovereign functions of a state
government."
The Wirtz decision represented a logical extension of the
commerce power under the precedent of Darby. The majority's
38. Id. at 195.
39. Id.
40. Id., citing Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946).
41. Id. at 196-97 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 203.
43. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
44. 392 U.S. at 205, citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946).
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dismissal of the argument that the tenth amendment and the
principle of state sovereignty existed as a limitation on the
congressional power under the commerce clause followed from
previous case law. However, as noted by Justice Douglas in his
dissent, the question of just how far the federal government
could go in regulating the states under the commerce clause
remained undecided.
B. The Lower Court Decision in National League of Cities v.
Brennan4 5
In late December 1974, the National League of Cities
brought an action in the district court for the District of Col-
umbia, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against
the 1974 amendments' application to them. A three-judge dis-
trict court granted the Secretary of Labor's motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted. The district court, while conceding that the
defendants' claim of federal intrusion into essential state gov-
ernmental functions was substantial, stated that only the Su-
preme Court could make the decision to modify the extensive
reach of the Wirtz decision. 8
That same day, Chief Justice Burger, sitting as a circuit
judge, granted the states' and municipalities' application for a
stay and injunction against the enforcement of certain parts of
the 1974 amendments to the Act, pending appeal from the
three-judge district court to the full Supreme Court.47
III. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES DECISION AND THE
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION TEST
In arguing before the Supreme Court, the appellant cities
and states had to convince a majority of the Justices that their
position was correct in spite of a line of cases which supported
the 1974 amendments to the Act. Not only did they have the
reasoning of the Wirtz decision to contend with, but the Court
had recently decided the case of Fry v. United States, 4 holding
the Economic Stabilization Act of 19701 to be a valid exercise
of the commerce power as applied to the states. The Fry Court
45. 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
46. Id. at 828.
47. 419 U.S. 1321 (1974).
48. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970).
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cited the Wirtz case as controlling in rejecting the state's con-
tention that the application of the Economic Stabilization Act
to state employees interfered with sovereign state functions. In
addition to this substantial contrary precedent, the appellants
had to contend with the retirement of Justice Douglas, who
wrote the strong dissent in Wirtz.
In National League of Cities the Supreme Court recognized
a distinction between the power of Congress to regulate indi-
vidual businesses and private citizens from the power to regu-
late states as states, 0 under the commerce clause. Although the
Court found that the 1974 amendments to the Act were within
the plenary power of Congress under the commerce clause, the
Court recognized an affirmative limitation on the exercise of
this power in the federal system of government embodied in the
Constitution, expressly recognized in the tenth amendment.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court,
acknowledged the states' contention that the application of
congressional commerce power directly to them as employers
encountered a "constitutional barrier."'5' He noted that in
Wirtz the Court had carefully assured the states that it had the
power to prevent the destruction of the sovereign political en-
tity of the state. He further noted that the Court in Fry had
recognized an express declaration of this limitation in the tenth
amendment.13
Justice Rehnquist then equated the constitutional barrier of
state sovereignty, which the Court had held to prohibit the
federal government from imposing nondiscriminatory taxes on
the states in New York v. United States,4 with the barrier upon
the exercise of the commerce power. In a footnote he dismissed
Justice Brennan's dissenting contention that Chief Justice
Stone in the New York case was not addressing the question of
a state sovereignty restraint upon the exercise of the commerce
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2471.
51. Id. at 2469.
52. Id. at 2469-70, citing 392 U.S. at 196.
53. Id. at 2470. In Fry, Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority, stated that
although the tenth amendment has been characterized as a mere truism, "it is not
without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity on their
ability to function effectively in a federal system." 421 U.S. at 547 (1975). Thus, to
some extent, the Fry case can be seen as a bridge between Wirtz and National League
of Cities in recognizing the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation.
54. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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power, but was addressing the principle of implied immunity
of the states and federal government from taxation by each
other. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the distinction was not
valid since the federal power to tax is a delegated power just
as is the commerce power: "[C]haracterizing the limitation
recognized upon the federal taxing power as an 'implied im-
munity' [does not] obscure the fact that this 'immunity' is
derived from the sovereignty of the States and the concomitant
barriers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary
federal authority. '5
After tracing the role of the states in our federal system of
government through earlier decisions of the Court, Justice
Rehnquist stated that the test as to whether congressional ac-
tion under the commerce clause would abrogate state sover-
eignty, and thus be unconstitutional, was "whether these
[states'] determinations are 'functions essential to separate
and independent existence'."5 He concluded that:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental
functions, what hours those persons will work, and what com-
pensation will be provided where these employees may be
called upon to work overtime.57
Justice Rehnquist then examined the degree to which the
amendments would interfere with traditional aspects of state
sovereignty. Echoing many of the findings of Justice Douglas'
dissent in Wirtz, 8 Justice Rehnquist found that the 1974
amendments would have a significant impact on the govern-
mental bodies involved by: (1) increasing costs in providing
essential police and fire protection, without any increase in
service, (2) forcing relinquishment of important governmental
activities, and (3) displacing state policies and choices regard-
ing the manner in which it will structure delivery of govern-
mental services which its citizens require. 59 Rehnquist viewed
the result as leaving to the states only the discretion "to at-
tempt to increase their revenue to meet the additional financial
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2470 n. 14.
56. Id. at 2471.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., 392 U.S. at 202-03.
59. 96 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
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burden . . . or to reduce [their existing complement of em-
ployees] to a number which can be paid the federal minimum
wage without increasing revenue."6 Therefore, he concluded
that the 1974 amendments on the states would impermissibly
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bod-
ies."' Minimizing the importance of the estimation of the effect
which the Act would have on the states' current levels and
patterns of governmental activity, Justice Rehnquist stated
that:
the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exer-
cise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum
wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their
capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, Congress
has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair
the States' "ability to function effectively within a federal
system," ... 62
The final portion of the majority opinion in National
League of Cities is devoted to clarifying the essential function
test by distinguishing the Fry and United States v. California
cases, and by overruling the Wirtz case. Justice Rehnquist dis-
tinguished the Fry case by noting that the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act was occasioned by an extremely serious problem which
only collective action by the central government might fore-
stall. He also noted that the means selected by Congress inter-
fered with the states' freedom for only a very limited period of
time. Additionally, he recognized that the across-the-board
wage freeze authorized by that Act did not displace any state
choices as to how governmental operations should be struc-
tured. Distinguishing Fry, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
the Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pres-
sures upon state budgets rather than increase them. 3
This conclusion appears to shed a great deal of light on the
real problem that the majority found with the extension of the
F.L.S.A. to the states. Unlike the Economic Stabilization Act
which operated to reduce state budgetary pressures, the exten-
sion of the F.L.S.A. would increase them. In distinguishing
Fry, Justice Rehnquist formulated the general rule that the
60. Id. at 2472.
61. Id. at 2473.
62. Id. at 2474 (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 2475.
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limits imposed upon the exercise of the commerce power when
applied to the states by Congress do not preclude temporary
enactments designed to resolve national emergencies. 4
In overruling Wirtz, the Court concluded that its reasoning
could no longer be regarded as authoritative. Justice Rehnqu-
ist noted that the Wirtz case relied heavily on the Court's deci-
sion in United States v. California (as did Justice B&rennan in
his dissent), in which the Court differentiated between the lim-
itation restricting the federal taxing power and the power of
Congress under the commerce clause.6 However, he argued
that the language from United States v. California relied upon
in Wirtz was simply "dicta" and "wrong."67 In a footnote, Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that:
The holding of United States v. California, ... as op-
posed to the language quoted in the text, is quite consistent
with our holding today. There California's activity to which
the congressional command was directed was not in an area
that the States have regarded as integral parts of their gov-'
ernmental activities. It was, on the contrary, the operation of
a railroad engaged in "common carriage by rail in interstate
commerce ... ."68
From this reasoning two principles emerge which must now
be kept in mind when attempting to determine whether con-
gressional legislation under the commerce clause has imper-
missibly interfered with the integral governmental functions of
the states. First, the degree to which the federal action inter-
feres with the traditional operations of state and local govern-
ment must be determined. If the effect is such as to destroy the
separate and independent existence of the states, the congres-
sional action is not within the power of the commerce clause.
This principle is derived from the test suggested by Chief Jus-
tice Stone in New York v. United States and involves a deter-
mination of whether the activity attempted to be regulated is
one traditionally undertaken by the state.69
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the Court had held that,
unlike the restriction on the federal taxing power, there was no such limitation upon
the plenary power of Congress to regulate commerce. As to the commerce clause power,
the Court placed the state on the same level as any individual citizen.
67. 96 S. Ct. at 2475.
68. Id. n. 18 (citations omitted).
69. To answer this question, it might prove useful to determine whether a regulated
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Second, it appears that the degree of permissible interfer-
ence with the traditional operations of state and local govern-
ments is greater when there is a national emergency or an ex-
tremely serious problem which endangers the well-being of all
the component parts of our federal system and which only
collective action by the national government might forestall.
This principle would justify action by the central government
such as that taken by Congress in enacting the Economic Sta-
bilization Act and stems directly from the Fry case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities
was labeled by Justice Brennan in his dissent as an "ill-
conceived abstraction [which could] only be regarded as a
transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment
with which [the majority] disagree."70 Justice Brennan
charged that the majority of the Court were returning to an
analysis of the commerce clause and the tenth amendment
resembling that found in the 1930's, which had provided a
constitutional crisis for the Court.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan recognized that the majority
opinion is a departure from previous constitutional precedent,
and thus, a major landmark in United States constitutional
law. The decision has given the constitutional principle of fed-
eralism new meaning by recognizing that the tenth amendment
stands as an affirmative limitation upon the authority of Con-
gress to regulate activities of states as states by means of the
commerce power. Although the Court noted that it expressed
no opinion as to whether different results might obtain if inte-
gral operations of state governments were affected by congres-
sional action under the spending power,71 section five of the
fourteenth amendment,72 or the war power,73 the constitutional
significance of this new principle is still great. The idea that
the tenth amendment exists as an affirmative limitation on the
power of the federal government is a far cry from viewing the
activity is "proprietary" or "governmental," as suggested by Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent in the Fry case. See 421 U.S. at 558 n. 2.
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2481.
71. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n. 17.
73. Id. at 2475 n. 18.
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tenth amendment as a mere "truism."74
Besides the far-reaching implications which the National
League of Cities decision presents for future relationships be-
tween the states and the federal government, the decision also
has immediate implications. The Court has prohibited Con-
gress from utilizing its power under the commerce clause "to
force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental func-
tions are to be made. 7 5 Decisions by the states in reference to
their employees' wages and overtime were conclusively deter-
mined to be "essential decisions." However, as noted above,
the Court specifically limited its decision to the utilization of
the commerce power. Thus, it is possible that the Court would
not find this "affirmative limitation" in respect to Congress'
other plenary powers. However, since Congress has utilized the
commerce power since the late 1930's for.authority for a large
amount of its legislation, some of this legislation as applied to
the states as states becomes subject to attack under the tenth
amendment.
The congressional legislation most obviously subject to
challenge are the amendatory acts to the F.L.S.A. itself, i.e.,
the Age Discrimination Act,76 and the Equal Pay Act.7 Al-
though the Court in National League of Cities did not specifi-
cally discuss these amendatory Acts, they were enacted by
Congress under the commerce power and are thus subject to
the same constitutional attack as in National League of Cities.
Therefore, if attacked by the states as unconstitutional they
would have to meet the essential function test.
In Christensen v. Iowa,78 the first district court to be faced
with this issue interpreted the National League of Cities case
narrowly, stating that the decision "should be confined strictly
to its factual context."79 The court held that the Equal Pay Act
may be constitutionally applied to the states pursuant to the
commerce clause since discrimination in pay on the basis of sex
74. See generally Justice Brennan's dissent, 96 S. Ct. at 2478-79 in which he
discussed the principle enunciated in United States v. Carby, i.e., the tenth amend-
ment is a mere "truism."
75. 96 S. Ct. at 2475-76.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1970).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 et seq. (1970).
78. 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.Iowa, 1976).
79. Id. at 424.
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cannot validly be considered a fundamental employment deci-
sion essential to the separate and independent existence of the
state. The court also noted that the ability to exercise such
discrimination is not an attribute of sovereignty 0 The district
court's opinion seems to be consistent with the National
League of Cities rationale, yet it is too early to say that this
restrictive interpretation will be adopted by the higher courts.
Other federal legislation which at first appears to be subject
to a constitutional attack by the states is the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act of 1972 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.81 Title VII as originally enacted was based
on Congress' power under the commerce clause. However,
when Congress extended the application of Title VII to the
states as employers by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972,81 Congress based this extension not only on the
commerce power, but also on section five of the fourteenth
amendment. 3 As previously noted, the Court in National
League of Cities specifically stated that it expressed no opinion
as to whether the affirmative limitation of state sovereignty,
which it recognized as to the exercise of congressional power
under the commerce clause, also existed in relation to the
power of Congress under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thus, a question is posed as to whether section five is
limited by the tenth amendment rationale promulgated by the
National League of Cities case.
80. Id. at 425. In Usery v. Salt Lake City Board of Education, No. C75-510 (D. Utah
Sept. 1, 1976), the district court held that the application of the Age Discrimination
Act withstands the National Cities rationale and is constitutional. Other district court
cases upholding the extension of the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination Act
to the states are as follows: Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., No. CA 76-
6-D (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 1976); Usery v. Fort Madison Community School Dist., No.
CA 75-62-1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1, 1976); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., No.
CA 76-248 (D. S.C. Aug. 24, 1976); Usery v. Sioux City Community School Dist., No.
CA 76-4024 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 20, 1976); Riley v. University of Lowell, No. CA 76-1118-
M (D. Mass. July 22, 1976).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107 (hereinafter cited as Title
VII).
82. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 provides, "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
10-11 (1971). This point was also noted by Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2670 n. 9 (1976).
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An interpretation recently given to section five of the four-
teenth amendment by Justice Rehnquist in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer"4 sheds light on this question. In that case, Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, held that the eleventh
amendment 5 did not bar an award of pension benefits owed by
the State of Connecticut under a Title VII claim, since that
amendment and the principle of state sovereignty which it rep-
resents is limited by the enforcement provisions of section five
of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, these enforcement
provisions themselves embody significant limitations on state
authority.
In Fitzpatrick the Court distinguished the power of
Congress to transgress the eleventh amendment limitation
under the commerce clause from that power under section five
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court interpreted Congress'
power to regulate the states under the fourteenth amendment
to be much broader than under the commerce clause and not
limited by the eleventh amendment. This is because the sub-
stantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment are by express
terms directed at the states and impress upon them duties with
respect to their treatment of private individuals. Additionally,
standing behind these substantive imperatives is the power of
Congress to enforce them by appropriate legislation."6 Although
this broad and powerful interpretation of section five of the
fourteenth amendment is given in relation to the effect on regu-
lation of the states of the eleventh amendment, the reasoning
would seem equally to apply to the effect of the tenth amend-
ment. In fact, Justice Rehnquist implied as much in a footnote
in Fitzpatrick .8 Thus, there is authority for distinguishing be-
tween the limitations on congressional regulation of the states
under the F.L.S.A. as enunciated in the National League of
Cities case and the Title VII provisions grounded upon the
fourteenth amendment.
National League of Cities also appears to limit efforts in
Congress to bring state and local government employees under
84. 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
85. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XI.
86. 96 S. Ct. at 2670.
87. Id. n. 9.
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a federal collective bargaining law. The House Labor Subcom-
mittee was reportedly awaiting the outcome of the National
League of Cities case8" before continuing work on a bill8" which
would have required collective bargaining between nonfederal
governments and their employees. Since collective bargaining
would interfere with the essential functions of state govern-
ment as much as would the regulation of minimum hours and
overtime held unconstitutional in National League of Cities,
the bill presently being drafted appears now to be unconstitu-
tional.
In National League of Cities the Court was careful not to
foreclose completely the power of Congress to regulate the
states. It established the essential function test and left open
the door for congressional regulation of essential state functions
under the commerce clause where collective action by the na-
tional government is necessary to forestall extraordinary public
harm. The Court also specifically left open federal regulation
of the states under other clauses of the Constitution. For exam-
ple, congressional power to regulate discriminatory state prac-
tices under section five of the fourteenth amendment has not
been restricted.
These restrictions suggest that Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion, has interpreted the Court's opinion cor-
rectly by asserting that the Court has adopted a balancing
approach.' Theoretically, this approach allows for the exercise
of federal power where necessary, but prevents the further dim-
inution of the role of the states in our federal system of govern-
ment. But National League of Cities leaves the factors to be
weighed unclear. Thus, it also appears that the Court will be
the ultimate arbitrator in balancing the respective interests
involved.
THOMAS GAUSDEN
88. CCH LAB. L. REP., REPORTS, No. 199 at 4 (May 28, 1976).
89. H.R. REP. No. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
90. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
91. 96 S. Ct. at 2476.
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